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The Disingenuous 2009-10
Budget
I S,ephen (‘hang3
School of Economics and Finance
The Universii3’ of Hong Kong
I will provide a full, clear and honest account oi our economic prospects. i nrougn clear appreciation
of the troubles we face together, we will endure and overcome them together.”
—Fourth Paragraph, the 2009-10 Budget
Introduction
The Financial Secretary recently claimed that the
Hong Kong stimulus package was “[e]vidently
stronger than those of many other economies”.
His claim was based on an overstatement of
the Hong Kong stimulus package that stemmed
from the inclusion of two rounds of measures
that were “already planned for” and not “crisisrelated”.
“crisisrelated”.Consequently, the cost of the package
was overstated to be 5.2 per cent of Hong Kong’s
GDP. On the other hand, he understated total
discretionary measures of the G-20 nations by
using old data and by excluding commitments
already announced for 2010 by the G-20 nations.
As a result, the cost of the G-20 nations’ tota
discretionary measures was understated to be a
weighted average of only 2.3 per cent of their
GDP. Had there been no such misstatements, the
cost of the Hong Kong stimulus package would
have been only 1.8 per cent of Hong Kong’s GDP
and that of the G-20 nations a weighted average of
4.0 per cent of their GDP. The truth was therefore
completely distorted. The deceptive claim of the
Financial Secretary is very disappointing.
The Hong Kong Stimulus
Package
Only 90 days after delivering the 2009-10
Budget, which was his second budget, the
Financial Secretary announced on 26 May 2009
additional relief measures of HK$16.8 billion.3
These measures increased the Hong Kong
stimulus package to a total cost estimated to be
about HKS87.6 billion, or 5,2 per cent of Hong
Kong’s GDP. The stimulus package consisted of
four rounds of measures spanning two fiscal years
from 2008 to 2010. In each of these two years,
two rounds of measures were offered.
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The first round of measures was launched by
the Financial Secretary at his first budget (i.e.
the 2008-09 Budget’) on 28 February 2008 and
the second round by the Chief Executive at the
Question and Answer Session in the Legislative
Council on 16 July 2008. The costs of the first
and the second rounds of measures were HK$46.5
billion and HK$11 billion, respectively, so their
total cost was HK$57.5 billion, or 3.4 per cent
(= 5.2 per cent x 57.5 ÷ 87.6) of GDP.
The third round of measures was given at the
2009-10 Budget. A simple calculation shows that
its cost was HK$1 3.3 billion (— HKS87.6 billion
—HK$57.5 billion —HK$16.8 billion). The third
round of measures was outweighed by the fourth
round of measures, that is, the additional relief
measures announced on 26 May 2009. These two
rounds of measures together corresponded to 1.8
per cent (= 5.2 per cent — 3.4 per cent) of GDP.
Comparison with G-20’s
Discretionary Measures
To compare the Hong Kong stimulus package
with those of other economies, the Financial
Secretary made the following reference to an
IMF report: “According to the report published
by the International Monetary Fund in March, the
average expenditure of the G-20 nations in this
respect accounts for 2.3% of their GDP.”7 As the
Hong Kong stimulus package was estimated to
be about 5.2 per cent of Hong Kong’s GDP. he
claimed that it was “[e]vidently ... stronger than
those of many other economies”.8
The IMF March report referred to by the Financial
Secretary was the Note on “Global Economic
Policies and Prospects” prepared by the staff of
the IMF for the meeting of the Group of Twenty
Ministers and Central Bank Governors on 13-14
March 2009 in London.9 The relevant figures from
the IMF March Note are reproduced in Table I.
Two observations are in order. First, the Financial
Secretary only used the first two columns under
the heading of the IMF March Note, which
show that the weighted average of discretionary
measures of the G-20 nations was 2.3 per cent
( 0.5 per cent + 1.8 per cent) of GD? in 2008-
09. Second. the 2009 March data used by the
Financial Secretary are not up-to-date. Indeed,
updated data were published by the IMF on
26 April 2009.” exactly one month before the
Financial Secretary made the comparison. The
updated data are also reproduced in Table 1. under
the heading “IMF April Update”. Using old data
to make the comparison shows that the Financial
Secretary is either ignorant or deliberately
misleading.
A sensible comparison is apples to apples,
oranges to oranges. According to both the
IMF March Note and the IMF April Update.
discretionary measures “reflect the budgetary
cost of crisis-relaied discretionary measures in
each year compared to 2007 (baseline). ... They
do not include (i) ‘below-the-line’ operations
that involve acquisition of assets (includtng
financial sector support) or (ii) measures that
were aireath planned for” (emphases added).
The latter condition excluded most measures that
were launched prior to late 2008.11 It should be
noted that discretionary measures in 2008 were
significantly weaker than those in either 2009
or 2010.
It is problematic for the Financial Secretary to
include the first two rounds of measures in the
Hong Kong stimulus package when comparing
it to discretionary measures in the IMF March
Note. The first round of measures was launched
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Table I. G-20 Countries: Discretionary Measures. 2008-10
(in percent of GDP) 1/
I MF March No te 2/ IM F April Update 3/4/
2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010
Argentina 0.0 1.3 ... 0.0 1.5 ...
Australia 0.7 2.1 1.7 0.7 2.1 1.7
Brazil 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.6 0.8
Canada 0.0 1.5 1.3 0.0 1.9 1.7
China 0.4 3.2 2.7 0.4 3.1 2.7
France 0.0 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.7 0.8
Germany 0.0 1.5 2.0 0.0 1.6 2.0
India 0.6 0.6 ... 0.6 0.6 0.6
Indonesia 0.0 1.3 0.6 0.0 1.3 0.6
Italy 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1
Japan 0.4 1.4 0.4 0.3 2.4 1.8
Korea 1.1 2.3 1.3 1.1 3.9 1.2
Mexico 0.0 1.5 ... 0.0 1.5 ...
Russia 0.0 2.3 1.6 0.0 4.1 1.3
Saudi Arabia 2.4 3.3 3.5 2.4 3.3 3.5
South Africa 1.7 1.8 —0.6 1.7 1.8 —0.6
Turkey 0.0 ... ... 0.0 0.8 0.3
United Kingdom 0.2 1.4 —0.1 0.2 1.4 —0.1
United States 1.1 2.0 1.8 1.1 2.0 1.8
G-20 PPP-GDPweighted
average
0.5 1.8 1.3 0.5 2.0 1.5
I. “...“ indicates that no information on the size of the fiscal package is available.
2. Source: Table I in Appendix I on p.37 of “Global Economic Policies and Prospects.
3. Source: Table 2 on p.5 of “Update on Fiscal Stimulus and Financial Sector Measures”.
4. Italics indicate a decrease in discretionary measures and bold indicates an increase.
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in February 2008 and the second round in July
2008. so they were “already planned for” by
late 2008. Including them overstated the Hong
Kong stimulus package, relative to discretionary
measures in either the IMF March Note or the
IMF April Update.
There is another reason that the first two rounds
of measures in the Hong Kong stimulus package
were not comparable to the discretionary
measures of the G-20 nations. The first two
rounds of measures were not “crisis-related”.
The Financial Secretary gave the following
assessment of the first round of measures in the
2008-09 Budget:
“[Tjhis will give some impetus to the overall
economy although the effect will not be
significant in 2008. ... The impact of these
measures will be felt in the medium to
long term and will not have any short term
economic impact these measures will not
generate a lot of domestic demand in a short
period of time. The stimulating effect on
inflation should be limited.”
Clearly, the first round of measures was intended to
minimise their short-term stimulating effect. This
is against the nature of “crisis-related” measures,
which are designed to generate immediate,
effective impact. It is illuminating to compare
how the Financial Secretary characterised “crisis-
related” measures when the additional relief
measures were announced on 26 May 2009: “[WI
hen considering the new reliefmeasures and their
intensity, we want them to be forward-looking,
simple and direct, ... so that they can benefit the
people as early as possible. The new measures
should also be targeted, timely and effective ....“°
Neither was the second round of measures
crisis-related. This is how the Chief Executive
208 As,o-Poc’hcJourno of Taxation
rationalised the second round of measures when
they were introduced on 16 July 2008:
“Today ... I think that it’s time for immediate
action because global oil and food prices
have increased rapidly in the first half of
the year. The drastic price increases
have upset the lives of Hong Kong people
and our social harmony. Therefore, I have
decided to announce some short-term relief
measures today to alleviate the pressure on
the grassroots and middle-class community
asa result of high inflation.”4
The second round of measures was purely
inflation-driven. Spinning them as “crisis-related”
is to have your cake and eat it too. Indeed, the
concern of inflation had been largely put aside
by the G-20 nations when discretionary measures
were being formulated.
Our analysis shows that the Hong Kong stimulus
package was overstated by the inclusion of the
first two rounds of measures. To rectify the
misstatements, these two rounds of measures necd
to be removed. Consequently, the cost of the Hong
Kong stimulus package only accounted for 1.8
per cent of Hong Kong’s GDP. or slightly above
one-third (0.35 = 1.8 per cent ÷ 5.2 per cent) of
the amount claimed by the Financial Secretary.
The Financial Secretary not only overstated the
stimulus package. but also understated the G20
nations’ discretionary measures. First, he used
the old data in the IMF March Note. Second.
he excluded discretionary measures already
committed by the G-20 nations for 2010. (Those
committed by the Hong Kong Government
for 2010 were already reflected in the 2009-
10 Budget and the additional relief measures
announced on 26 May 2009.) After correcting
these two understatements, the cost of the G-20
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nations’ total discretionary measures for 2008-10
increased to a weighted average of 4.0 per cent
0.5 per cent 2.0 per cent t 1.5 per cent) of
their GDP. or almost one-and-three-quarters times
(1.74 = 4 per cent + 2.3 per cent) the figure used
by the Financial Secretary.
Either the overstatement or the understatement
alone is a gross misstatement. Two wrongs don’t
make a right. They are even deceptive in this case.
The overstated stimulus package was 2.26 (= 5.2
per cent + 2.3 per cent) times the understated
G-20 nations’ discretionary measures (by percent
of GDP). This is an outright contradiction of the
fact that the G-20 nations’ total discretionary
measures were 2.22 ( 4.0 per cent ÷ 1.8 per cent)
times the Hong Kong stimulus package (also by
percent of GDP).
Concluding Remarks
The Financial Secretary argued that he had offered
a patently strong stimulus package to help Hong
Kong overcome the once-in-a-century financial
tsunami. Alas, the claim is false. It is based on
an overstated Hong Kong stimulus package and
understated G-20 nations’ discretionary measures.
The Hong Kong stimulus package was overstated
by including non-crisis-related measures. The
Costs of the crisis-related measures and the
non-crisis-related measures accounted for 1.8
per cent and 3.4 per cent of Hong Kong’s GDP.
respectively. It is absurd that the crisis-related
measures in 2009 were even weaker than the
non-crisis-related measures prior to late 2008.
Ironically, we had counted on the Government
for strong doses of medicine during late 2008 and
the first half of 2009)
Food for Thought
We end this article with a counterfactual
analysis. How much would it have cost the
Government to offer a genuine package that was
“evidently stronger than” the G-20 nations’ total
discretionary measures?
A back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that
such a package would be around 22516 times
the G-20 nations’ total discretionary measures
(by percent of GDP), so it would be 9 per cent
( 4 per cent + 2.25) of Hong Kong’s GDP or
HK$150.5 billion, corresponding to one-third of
Hong Kong’s fiscal reserve!
Putting money where the Financial Secretary’s
mouth is would not only have cost the Government
a fortune, but also would have led to a violation
of the budgetary guideline of limiting public
expenditure to less than 20 per cent of GDP, and
even of the principles of prudent management
of public finances stipulated in Article 107 of
the Basic Law. Nonetheless, making a deceptive
claim is inexcusable. Such engineering of a
financial shenanigan by the Financial Secretary
is equivalent to a government accounting scandal.
Endnotes
t. I am grateful to Kani-Ming Wan and an
anonymous referee for detailed comments.
School of Economics and Finance. The
University of Hong Kong. Pokfulam Road,
Hong Kong: Email: steve.ching)hku.hk
2. The 2009-10 Budget was delivered on 25
February 2009 (available at: <http://www.
hudget.gov.hk/2009/eng/speech.html>).
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3. The “Additional Relief Measures” is available
at: <http://www.legco.gov.hk/yrO8-09/
english/panels/fa/papersifa0529cb 1-1740-
l-e.pdf5’.
4. The 2008-09 Budget is available at: <http://
www.budget.gov.hk./2008’eng speech.html>.
5. The
“Opening Remarks by CE at Question
and Answer Session in Legislative Council”
is available at: <http://www.info.gov.hklgial
general/200807/l 6/P200807 160261 .htm>.
6. See the third-to-last paragraph of the
“Opening Remarks by CE at Question and
Answer Session in Legislative Council”.
7. See the ninth paragraph of the “Additional
Relief Measures”.
8. [hid.
14. See the first paragraph of the “Opening
Remarks by CE at Question and Answer
Session in Legislative Council”.
15. “Below-the-line” operations that involve
acquisition of assets (including financial
sector support) were not considered as
discretionary measures by the IMF.
16. We pick a number between 2.22 and 2.26 for
ease of calculation. The latter two numbers
are obtained at the end of the previous
section. II
9. The IMF March Note is available at: <http://
www.imf.org/extemal/np/g20/pdf/03 l9O9a.
pdf’.
10. The “Update on Fiscal Stimulus and Financial
Sector Measures” is available at: <http://
www.imf.org/external/np/fadJ2009/0426O9.
pdf>.
11. Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy under
Chapter Il on 15 September 2008.
12. See paragraphs 189-191 of the 2008-09
Budget.
13. See the fourth paragraph of the “Additional
Relief Measures”.
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